Rational choice by two sequential criteria by García-Sanz, María D. & Alcantud, José Carlos R.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Rational choice by two sequential criteria
Mar´ıa D. Garc´ıa-Sanz and Jose´ Carlos R. Alcantud
Universidad de Salamanca
16. March 2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21487/
MPRA Paper No. 21487, posted 19. March 2010 22:31 UTC
Rational Choice by two Sequential Criteria
María D. García-Sanz 1,2, José Carlos R. Alcantud 1
Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de Salamanca, E 37008
Salamanca, Spain
Abstract
This paper contributes to the theory of rational choice under multiple criteria.
We perform a preliminary study of the properties of decision made by the sequential
application of rational choices. This is then used to obtain a characterization of set-
valued choice functions that are rational by two sequential criteria, which follows the
approach initiated by Manzini and Mariotti [16] for single-valued choice functions.
Uniqueness is not guaranteed but our proof is constructive and an explicit solution
is provided in terms of approximation choice functions.
Key words: choice function, rational choice, compound function.
JEL Classification: D0.
∗ Corresponding author
Email addresses: dgarcia@usal.es (María D. García-Sanz), jcr@usal.es (José
Carlos R. Alcantud).
1 Both authors acknowledge financial support by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia
e Innovación under Project ECO2009-07682, and by Junta de Castilla y León under
Project SA024A08 and GR-99 funding. We thank Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti
for valuable comments.
2 This paper is part of García-Sanz’s doctoral dissertation under the supervision of
the second author and Ignacio García-Jurado. Financial support by Ministerio de
Educación y Ciencia under Project SEJ2007-67068 is gratefully acknowledged.
Preprint submitted to Elsevier
1 Introduction
The literature on abstract choice theory abounds with analysis of the possi-
ble rationality of a choice function via satisfaction of consistency properties,
although the precise meaning of the term “rationality” is subject to interpreta-
tions. The identification of rational choice as “optimizing behavior” has a long
tradition in the literature. A standard position identifies a rational choice
function with the result of the optimization of a generating binary relation
irrespective of its properties (cf., Arrow [6], Richter [21,22], Wilson [31], Sen
[24], Blair et al. [9], Suzumura [28], etc). In addition, the literature vastly
deals with enhanced generating relations, and the implications of acyclicity,
transitivity, quasi-transitivity, ... are extensively studied.
Another aspect to bear in mind is the possibility of incorporating different
criteria into the process. Previous contributions have approached this topic
in several forms. Kalai et al. [15] study the rationality of a choice function
by multiple binary relations, when the choice is a single element and all the
relations are simultaneously applied to each set of alternatives. Houy [13]
analyses whether the order of the criteria affects the final choice or not. Various
procedures of choice for lexicographic applications of multiple criteria have
been considered by Houy and Tadenuma [14]. In this paper we focus on the
case where a number of criteria are applied in a sequential way, a process
that we call sequential choice. Under this general perspective, the bahavior of
a decision maker (DM) is conceived of as rational not only when his choice
function derives from a single binary relation, but also when it is the sequential
application of such type of choices.
Our contribution adds to a branch of the literature from which we pinpoint
two focal references. In the first place, Manzini and Mariotti [16] are concerned
with singled-valued choice functions that are the result of a sequential appli-
cation of binary relations. They provide a complete analysis of the case of two
and three relations. In the second place, Apesteguía and Ballester [5] comple-
ment this achievement and characterize singled-valued choice functions that
can be rationalized by the sequential application of any number of rational
choice functions. By contrast with these works, we approach the problem in
terms of set-valued choice functions although we restrict ourselves to the se-
quential application of two relations. We also emphasize that we do not require
the asymmetry restriction imposed by them to the binary relations in their
model. In addition to those references, Masatlioglu et al. [18] study a related
model under single-valued choice functions. They admit the possibility of se-
lecting an alternative x in the presence of y when the DM prefers y, because
he simply does not realize that y is also available. This model concerns a DM
that only pays attention to a subset from each set of alternatives, which can
be considered as a set-valued choice function. From this subset a final unique
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selection is made.
Since we aim at identifying choices that arise from a sequential application of
rational choice functions, a crucial previous step is the analysis of the behav-
ior of rationality with respect to composition (technically: of the rationality
properties of the compound choice function). To this purpose, in Section 2 we
set our notation and recall rationality properties of choice that are the key
to analyse rational choice functions. Then in Section 3 we study some axioms
for choice functions that permit to infer relevant properties of their compound
function. Aizerman and Aleskerov [3] made a partial study of this issue, to
which we add with further conclusions. Besides, the usual characterizations of
rationalizability of choice functions permit to state direct corollaries in terms
of rationality of a choice function obtained by the composition of two rational
choice functions.
Finally we approach the problem of identifying choice functions that arise as
the composition of two rational choice functions, that is, choice functions that
are rational by two sequential criteria. We give a complete characterization via
two testable necessary and sufficient conditions, and an explicit expression for
a solution (uniqueness can not be guaranteed) is provided. This constitutes
Section 4. We conclude with some final remarks in Section 5.
2 Definitions and properties of rationality
In this section we set the notation and introduce properties of rationality for
a choice function that are common in related literature.
Along this paper X denotes a general set of alternatives and P(X) is the set of
subsets of X. A binary relation on X is a subset R ⊆ X×X, and we interpret
xRy –a shorthand for (x, y) ∈ R– as “x is weakly preferred to y”. Besides, R
produces a strict relation PR (the asymmetric part of R) and an indifference
relation IR (the symmetric part of R) on X according to:
xPRy ⇔ {xRy and not yRx}, and xIRy ⇔ {xRy and yRx}.
The following properties of a binary relation are relevant in our study.
Definition 1 Let R be a binary relation on X.
• R is reflexive if xRx for all x ∈ X.
• R is transitive if whenever xRy and yRz it is true that xRz.
• R is complete if for any x, y ∈ X either xRy or yRx is true.
• R is an ordering if it is transitive and complete.
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• R is quasi-transitive if its asymmetric part PR is transitive.
• R is acyclic if for any finite sequence of alternatives {x1, . . . , xt} such that
(x1, x2) ∈ PR, (x2, x3) ∈ PR, . . . , (xt−1, xt) ∈ PR
one has (xt, x1) 6∈ PR.
Definitions 2 and 3 below formalize the concepts of decisive choice function
and rational choice function.
Definition 2 Let D be a nonempty domain of nonempty subsets of X, that
is, ∅ 6= D ⊆ P(X) and S 6= ∅ for all S ∈ D. A decisive choice function on
D is a map C : D → P(X) such that ∅ 6= C(S) ⊆ S for all S ∈ D.
Unless otherwise stated, along this paper we are bound by two technical re-
strictions. Firstly, all choice functions are decisive thus choice function holds
for decisive choice function. Secondly, D is the domain consisting of all finite
and nonempty subsets of X. 3
Definition 3 A choice function C on D is rational if there exists a binary
relation R on X such that C(S) = CR(S) = {x ∈ S : ∀y ∈ S, (x, y) ∈ R}, for
any set of alternatives S ∈ D.
Definition 3 captures the idea that the choice is made by optimization of a
preference relation R, and we also say that R rationalizes the choice function
C.When the preference relation R is an ordering, it renders complete rational-
ity and we say that C is full rational ; if R is quasi-transitive then we say that
the choice function C is quasi-transitive rational ; and if R is acyclic then the
choice function C is acyclic rational. Of course, full rationality implies quasi-
transitive rationality, which in turn implies acyclic rationality. As D contains
all singletons and pairs of alternatives, any binary relation that rationalizes a
decisive choice function on D is reflexive and complete.
Definitions 4 and 5 below concern a choice function C on a domain D. They
respectively deal with contraction and expansion properties that are crucial
for our analysis.
Definition 4 The choice function C satisfies
• The Chernoff condition, also CH, if for any S, T ∈ D such that S ⊆ T
we have C(T ) ∩ S ⊆ C(S).
3 The results would not be affected if the domain includes all the infinite subsets as
well, and even some of them are true for domains containing all pairs and all triples
from X only. We set this framework in order to avoid unnecessary technicalities and
concentrate on the sequential application of criteria.
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• Arrow’s axiom, also A, if for any S, T ∈ D such that S ⊆ T it is true
that C(T ) ∩ S = C(S).
• The Superset property, also SUP, if for all S, T ∈ D such that S ⊆ T
and C(T ) ⊆ C(S) we have C(S) = C(T ).
It is obvious that Arrow’s axiom is stronger than the Chernoff condition.
Definition 5 We say that C satisfies Property γ (cf., Sen [24]), also γ, if
for any collection {Mi}i∈I of subsets of D the following holds true:
x ∈ C(Mi) for all i ∈ I entails x ∈ C (∪i∈IMi)
This property is stronger than the Concordance property which establishes
that C(S) ∩ C(T ) ⊆ C(S ∪ T ) throughout. We are especially interested in a
generalization of Property γ that we call the binariness property 4 .
Definition 6 The choice function C satisfies the Binariness property, also
B, if for any S ∈ D we have: x ∈ C({x, y}) for all y ∈ S implies x ∈ C(S).
Properties CH, SUP, and γ are independent, but Arrow’s axiom is stronger
than any of them. The next diagram summarizes the relationships among the
properties above.
Arrow’s axiom⇒

Chernoff condition
Superset property
Property γ ⇒ Binariness
3 Rationality of a compound choice function
As has been mentioned, we are interested in identifying choice functions that
arise from a sequential application of rational choice functions. Therefore a
crucial previous step is the analysis of the behavior of rationality with respect
to composition. From a technical perspective, we proceed to study the preser-
vation of certain rationality properties of choice functions under the operation
of composition, because such properties characterize rationalizability.
We first formalize the idea of a sequential application of two criteria of decision
making.
4 This postulate is also named the Direct Condorcet Property or Condorcet consis-
tency in the literature.
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Definition 7 Let X be a set of alternatives and C1 : D1 → P(X) and C2 :
D2 → P(X) two choice functions with respective domains D1 and D2, in such
way that C1(D1) ⊆ D2. We define the composition of C1 and C2, also the
compound function of C1 and C2, as the map C2 ◦ C1 : D1 → P(X) given by
(C2 ◦ C1)(A) = C2(C1(A)) for all A ∈ D1
Following our convention we assume D1 = D2 = D, the domain of all finite
and nonempty subsets of alternatives.
Now we recall a characterization theorem for full rational choice functions.
Theorem 1 (Arrow [6]) A choice function C over D is full rational if and
only if it satisfies Arrow’s axiom.
Aizerman and Aleskerov [3] have established that Arrow’s axiom is preserved
under the composition of choice functions. Thus we can state:
Corollary 1 Whenever we have full rational choice functions C1, . . . , Cn on
D, the choice function Cn ◦ . . . ◦ C1 is full rational too.
We continue our inspection with the case of quasi-transitive rational choice
functions. We begin recalling the following characterization theorem.
Theorem 2 (Blair et al. [9], p. 367) A choice function C on D is quasi-
transitive rational if and only if it satisfies CH, SUP and B.
Although the composition of two choice functions that satisfy CH does not
necessarily preserve such property, if C1 satisfies A and C2 satisfies CH then
C2 ◦ C1 satisfies CH too (cf., Aizerman and Aleskerov [3]). We proceed to
study to what extent properties SUP and B are preserved by composition.
Propositions 1 and 2 below provide insights in this respect.
Proposition 1 Let C1 and C2 be choice functions on D. If C1 satisfies A and
C2 satisfies SUP, then C2 ◦ C1 satisfies SUP.
Proof. Let us select S, T ∈ D such that S ⊆ T and (C2◦C1)(T ) ⊆ (C2◦C1)(S).
We must prove that (C2 ◦ C1)(S) = (C2 ◦ C1)(T ).
As C1 satisfies A we have C1(T ) ∩ S = C1(S), thus C1(S) ⊆ C1(T ).
Because C2 (C1(T )) ⊆ C2 (C1(S)) and C2 satisfies SUP, we can conclude (C2 ◦
C1)(S) = (C2 ◦ C1)(T ). 
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Proposition 2 Let C1 be a choice function on D that satisfies B and CH. If
C2 is a choice function on D that satisfies B then C2 ◦ C1 satisfies B too.
Proof.
We have to prove that for any S ∈ D
x ∈ (C2 ◦ C1)({x, y}),∀y ∈ S ⇒ x ∈ (C2 ◦ C1)(S)
Since C2 satisfies B we have
x ∈ C2({x, z}), ∀z ∈ C1(S)⇒ x ∈ C2(C1(S))
Then we are done if we prove that x ∈ C2({x, z}) holds true for any z ∈ C1(S).
We first observe that z ∈ C1(S) implies z ∈ C1({x, z}) for all x ∈ S because
C1 satisfies CH.
Moreover from x ∈ C2(C1({x, y})) for all y ∈ S, we deduce x ∈ C1({x, y}) for
all y ∈ S. Therefore C1({x, z}) = {x, z} for all z ∈ C1(S).
Also from x ∈ C2(C1({x, y})) ∀y ∈ S we obtain
x ∈ C2(C1({x, z})) = C2({x, z}) ∀z ∈ C1(S)
which concludes the proof. 
Corollary 2 below establishes the quasi-transitive rationality of the compound
choice function of a full rational choice function with a quasi-transitive ratio-
nal. Afterwards a short analysis of the structure of the composition of quasi-
transitive rational choice functions complements such result.
Corollary 2 Let C1 and C2 be choice functions defined on D. If C1 is full
rational and C2 is quasi-transitive rational, then C2 ◦ C1 is quasi-transitive
rational.
If we relax the assumptions of Corollary 2 to quasi-transitive rationality to C1,
then the compound choice function may not satisfy the superset property as
the next example proves.
Example 1 Let X = {x, y, z, t} and let us define the next choice functions
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C1 and C2 on its nonempty subsets according to: 5
C1({x, y}) = {x, y}
C1({x, z}) = {x, z}
C1({x, t}) = {t}
C1({y, z}) = {y, z}
C1({y, t}) = {y, t}
C1({z, t}) = {z, t}
C1({x, y, z}) = {x, y, z}
C1({x, y, t}) = {y, t}
C1({x, z, t}) = {z, t}
C1({y, z, t}) = {y, z, t}
C1({x, y, z, t}) = {y, z, t}
C2({x, y}) = {x, y}
C2({x, z}) = {x, z}
C2({x, t}) = {x, t}
C2({y, z}) = {y, z}
C2({y, t}) = {y, t}
C2({z, t}) = {z}
C2({x, y, z}) = {x, y, z}
C2({x, y, t}) = {x, y, t}
C2({x, z, t}) = {x, z}
C2({y, z, t}) = {y, z}
C2({x, y, z, t} = {x, y, z}
Both choice functions satisfy property γ (therefore B), CH and SUP. Their
composition C = C2 ◦ C1 is given by
C({x, y}) = {x, y}
C({x, z}) = {x, z}
C({x, t}) = {t}
C({y, z}) = {y, z}
C({y, t}) = {y, t}
C({z, t}) = {z}
C({x, y, z}) = {x, y, z}
C({x, y, t}) = {y, t}
C({x, z, t}) = {z}
C({y, z, t}) = {y, z}
C({x, y, z, t}) = {y, z}
which does not satisfy SUP because C({x, z, t}) = {z} $ C({x, z}).
From Proposition 2 we obtain the following consequence.
Corollary 3 Let C be a choice function on D. If C is a compound function
of quasi-transitive rational choice functions, then C satisfies B.
5 Because all choice functions in the paper are decisive we avoid the redundant
assertion ‘C({a}) = {a} for every a ∈ X’ throughout.
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Finally we recall the conditions for a choice function to be acyclic rational or,
equivalently, rational. 6
Theorem 3 (Blair et al. [9]) A choice function on D is acyclic rational if
and only if it satisfies the Chernoff condition and the binariness property.
An appeal to Proposition 2 and Theorem 3 produces the next immediate
consequence.
Corollary 4 Let C1 and C2 be choice functions defined on D. If C1 is full
rational and C2 is acyclic rational then C2 ◦ C1 is acyclic rational.
Nevertheless if we compound two quasi-transitive rational choice functions we
obtain a choice function that is not necessarily acyclic rational, because it may
not satisfy the Chernoff condition as the next example proves.
Example 2 Let us consider the choice functions
C1({x, y}) = {x, y}
C1({x, z}) = {x, z}
C1({x, t}) = {x, t}
C1({y, z}) = {y}
C1({y, t}) = {y, t}
C1({z, t}) = {z, t}
C1({x, y, z}) = {x, y}
C1({x, y, t}) = {x, y, t}
C1({x, z, t}) = {x, z, t}
C1({y, z, t}) = {y, t}
C1({x, y, z, t}) = {x, y, t}
and
C2({x, y}) = {x, y}
C2({x, z}) = {x, z}
C2({x, t}) = {x, t}
C2({y, z}) = {y, z}
C2({y, t}) = {y, t}
C2({z, t}) = {z}
C2({x, y, z}) = {x, y, z}
C2({x, y, t}) = {x, y, t}
C2({x, z, t}) = {x, z}
C2({y, z, t}) = {y, z}
C2({x, y, z, t} = {x, y, z}
Both C1 and C2 satisfy γ (therefore B), CH and SUP.
6 Suzumura [29, page 35] establishes that a choice function on D is acyclic rational if
and only if it is rational, and that this equivalence does not hold for general domains.
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The compound function C = C2 ◦ C1 is given by
C({x, y}) = {x, y}
C({x, z}) = {x, z}
C({x, t}) = {x, t}
C({y, z}) = {y}
C({y, t}) = {y, t}
C({z, t}) = {z}
C({x, y, z}) = {x, y}
C({x, y, t}) = {x, y, t}
C({x, z, t}) = {x, z}
C({y, z, t}) = {y, t}
C({x, y, z, t}) = {x, y, t}
and it does not satisfy CH because {x, z, t} ⊆ {x, y, z, t} but
C({x, y, z, t}) ∩ {x, z, t} = {x, t} * {x, z} = C({x, z, t})
Our next Proposition gathers some conclusions from the analysis above.
Proposition 3 If C1 and C2 are choice functions on D that satisfy CH and
B then C2 ◦ C1 may not satisfy CH (Example 2), thus it may not be acyclic
rational (⇔ rational). Therefore the compound choice function of two acyclic
rational (⇔ rational) choice functions is not necessarily rational. Even if C1
and C2 are quasi-transitive rational (⇔ both satisfy CH, B and SUP), then
C2 ◦ C1 is not necessarily rational.
We conclude this Section with the following immediate consequence of Propo-
sition 2.
Corollary 5 Let C be a choice function on D. If C is a compound function
of acyclic rational (or equivalently, rational) choice functions on D, then C
satisfies B.
4 Choice functions rational by two sequential criteria
Along this Section our primitive concept is the choice made by a decision-
maker for some sets of alternatives. We investigate when this behavior can
be explained by the sequential application of two rational choice functions.
Theorem 5 below completely characterizes such class of choice functions. Some
examples help to clarify its implications.
To this porpose we first introduce the concepts of upper and lower approxi-
mations of a choice function in a class (Aizerman and Aleskerov [3]). They
try to approximate a non-rational choice function by a rational one and in the
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end, yield a solution to the problem we have posed ourselves. We emphasize
that not only we characterize the choice functions that can be written as the
composition of two rational ones but also we give an explicit solution to that
problem.
Let Q an arbitrary class of choice functions on D. A common interpretation
is that Q contains all choice functions that verify certain relevant properties.
Definition 8 The upper approximation in Q of a choice function C is a choice
function Cu ∈ Q such that C(S) ⊆ Cu(S) for any S ∈ D, with the property
that if C¯ is another choice function in Q satisfying C(S) ⊆ C¯(S) for all S ∈ D,
it must be the case that Cu(S) ⊆ C¯(S) for all S ∈ D. We stress the fact that
Cu is forcefully decisive because so is C and C(S) ⊆ Cu(S) throughout.
Definition 9 The lower approximation in Q of a choice function C is a (pos-
sibly indecisive) choice function Cl ∈ Q such that Cl(S) ⊆ C(S) for any
S ∈ D, with the property that if C¯ is another choice function in Q satisfy-
ing C¯(S) ⊆ C(S) for all S ∈ D, it must be the case that C¯(S) ⊆ Cl(S) for all
S ∈ D.
When a choice function is the sequential application of two rational choice
functions, the latter functions verify CH and B. Focusing on such class for
analysis is meaningful and in fact, to our purposes the relevant class is the one
containing the choice functions that verify CH and γ that we denote by Q0.
The next result (Theorem 5.15 in Aizerman and Aleskerov [3]) assures that
upper approximations in Q0 exist and also that lower approximations in Q0
exist under B.
Theorem 4 For any choice function C on D the upper approximation in Q0
exists, and it is given by the expression
Cu(S) = {x ∈ S : ∀y ∈ S there exists S ′ ∈ D with x, y ∈ S ′ and x ∈ C(S ′)}
for any S ∈ D.
Moreover if C satisfies B then the lower approximation of C in Q0 exists, and
it is given by the expression
Cl(S) = {x ∈ S : x ∈ C({x, y}), ∀y ∈ S} for any S ∈ D.
Remark 1 By virtue of Theorem 3 we conclude that Cu in Theorem 4 is
rational. Alternatively it is easy to check that
Ru defined as xRuy ⇔ ∃S ∈ D : x, y ∈ S and x ∈ C(S) rationalizes Cu
The rationality of Cl in Theorem 4 can not be directly derived from Theorem 3
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because Cl(S) may be empty for some S ∈ D. Nevertheless the complete binary
relation Rl given by xRly if and only if x ∈ C({x, y}) rationalizes Cl.
We now introduce a new property for a choice function C on D. It provides
the solution to the main problem of the paper.
Definition 10 A choice function C satisfies Property P if for any x, y ∈ X
and S, T ∈ D such that {x, y} ⊆ S ⊆ T, the following holds true:
if C({x, y}) = {x} and x ∈ C(T ), then it must be the case that y 6∈ C(S)
Property P is weaker than the Chernoff condition thus any rational choice
function satisfies it. Moreover this property allows for cyclical patterns.
The next example shows that if a choice function on D satisfies property P
then it must satisfy neither binariness nor the Chernoff condition, the two
necessary and sufficient conditions for such choice function to be rational.
Example 3 Let C be the choice function defined on the domain of nonempty
subsets of X = {x, y, z, t} given by
C({x, y}) = {x, y}
C({x, z}) = {x}
C({x, t}) = {x, t}
C({y, z}) = {y}
C({y, t}) = {y, t}
C({z, t}) = {z, t}
C({x, y, z}) = {y}
C({x, y, t}) = {x, y, t}
C({x, z, t}) = {x, t}
C({y, z, t}) = {y, t}
C({x, y, z, t}) = {x, y, t}
This choice function does not satisfy the binariness property because x ∈
C({x, y}) and x ∈ C({x, z}) but x 6∈ C({x, y, z}). Moreover it does not satisfy
the Chernoff condition because C({x, y, z, t})∩{x, y, z} = {x, y} * C({x, y, z}).
Nonetheless C satisfies property P.
In addition there exist choice functions satisfying Property γ which do not
satisfy property P as we can observe in Example 4 below.
Example 4 Let C be a choice function defined on the domain of nonempty
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subsets of X = {x, y, z, t} given by
C({x, y}) = {y}
C({x, z}) = {z}
C({x, t}) = {x, t}
C({y, z}) = {y}
C({y, t}) = {y, t}
C({z, t}) = {z}
C({x, y, z}) = {y, x}
C({x, y, t}) = {y, t}
C({x, z, t}) = {z}
C({y, z, t}) = {y, t}
C({x, y, z, t}) = {y, t}
It is simple to check that C satisfies Property γ. However it does not satisfy P
since {x, y} ⊆ {x, y, z} ⊆ {x, y, z, t} and C({x, y}) = {y}, y ∈ C({x, y, z, t}),
but x ∈ C({x, y, z}).
Despite this performance we proceed to prove that a choice function satisfying
properties P and γ can be written as the composition of two rational choice
functions. We formalize this concept in the next definition.
Definition 11 A choice function C on D is rational by two sequential criteria
if there exist two rational choice functions C1 and C2 on D (C2 being possibly
indecisive) such that C = C2 ◦ C1, i.e., such that the composition of C1 and C2
yields C. 7
Rational choice functions are obviously rational by two sequential criteria,
but the converse is not true as shown by Example 5 below. In turn, Lemma 1
shows that the composition of rational choice functions satisfies γ.
Lemma 1 If C1 and C2 are rational choice functions on D, then the compound
choice function C2 ◦ C1 satisfies Property γ.
Proof. Let us denote the binary relations that rationalize C1 and C2 by R1
and R2 respectively, i.e., for all S ∈ D,
C1(S) = {x ∈ S : (x, y) ∈ R1, ∀y ∈ S} = CR1(S)
C2(S) = {x ∈ S : (x, y) ∈ R2, ∀y ∈ S} = CR2(S)
We denote C = C2 ◦ C1, i.e., C(S) = CR2(CR1(S)) throughout. We proceed to
check that C satisfies Property γ.
Let {Si}i∈I be a collection of sets in D such that x ∈ C(Si) for all i ∈ I.
We must prove that x ∈ C(⋃i∈I Si). Since x ∈ CR2(CR1(Si)) for all i ∈ I thus
7 Observe that C2 must be nonempty-valued on {C1(S) : S ∈ D}.
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x ∈ CR1(Si) for all i ∈ I, this leads to
xR1y for all y ∈ Si ∀i ∈ I ⇒ xR1y ∀y ∈
⋃
i∈I
Si ⇒ x ∈ CR1(
⋃
i∈I
Si)
If x 6∈ CR2(CR1(
⋃
i∈I Si)), then there exists z ∈ CR1(
⋃
i∈I Si) such that ¬(xR2z).
But on the other hand z ∈ CR1(
⋃
i∈I Si) implies that z ∈ CR1(Si) for some i ∈ I.
Because x ∈ CR2(CR1(Si)) for all i ∈ I we obtain that xR2z, a contradiction
that proves x ∈ C(⋃i∈I Si). 
Lemma 1 assures that γ is a necessary condition for a choice function to be
rational by two sequential criteria. By contrast, Example 5 below shows that
this is not the case for CH: a choice function satisfying γ and not CH can be
written as the composition of its rational approximation functions. Moreover
it makes explicit the fact that we can not assure uniqueness of the solution to
our problem.
Example 5 Let X = {x, y, z, t}. We define the choice function C on the do-
main of nonempty subsets of X as:
C({x, y}) = {x, y}
C({x, z}) = {x, z}
C({x, t}) = {x, t}
C({y, z}) = {y}
C({y, t}) = {y, t}
C({z, t}) = {z}
C({x, y, z}) = {x, y}
C({x, y, t}) = {x, y, t}
C({x, z, t}) = {x, z}
C({y, z, t}) = {y, t}
C({x, y, z, t}) = {x, y, t}
This choice function satisfies Property γ and it does not satisfy the Chernoff
condition because {x, z, t} ⊆ {x, y, z, t} but C({x, y, z, t})∩{x, z, t} = {x, t} *
{x, z} = C({x, z, t}). Nevertheless it satisfies the weaker property P.
Theorem 4 provides the explicit expressions for the upper and lower rational
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approximations of C in Q0.
Cu({x, y}) = {x, y}
Cu({x, z}) = {x, z}
Cu({x, t}) = {x, t}
Cu({y, z}) = {y}
Cu({y, t}) = {y, t}
Cu({z, t}) = {z, t}
Cu({x, y, z}) = {x, y}
Cu({x, y, t}) = {x, y, t}
Cu({x, z, t}) = {x, z, t}
Cu({y, z, t}) = {y, t}
Cu({x, y, z, t}) = {x, y, t}
Cl({x, y}) = {x, y}
Cl({x, z}) = {x, z}
Cl({x, t}) = {x, t}
Cl({y, z}) = {y}
Cl({y, t}) = {y, t}
Cl({z, t}) = {z}
Cl({x, y, z}) = {x, y}
Cl({x, y, t}) = {x, y, t}
Cl({x, z, t}) = {x, z}
Cl({y, z, t}) = {y}
Cl({x, y, z, t}) = {x, y}
The equality C = Cl ◦ Cu can be checked directly.
Nevertheless these choice functions Cu and Cl do not provide a unique solution
to our problem in this particular case as we can see by replacing Cl with the
choice function C¯ defined as follows.
C¯({x, y}) = {x, y}
C¯({x, z}) = {x, z}
C¯({x, t}) = {x, t}
C¯({y, z}) = {y, z}
C¯({y, t}) = {y, t}
C¯({z, t}) = {z}
C¯({x, y, z}) = {x, y, z}
C¯({x, y, t}) = {x, y, t}
C¯({x, z, t}) = {x, z}
C¯({y, z, t}) = {y, z}
C¯({x, y, z, t}) = {x, y, z}
C¯ satisfies property γ and the Chernoff condition too. Some simple computa-
tions show that C = C¯ ◦ Cu.
Our main Theorem identifies the class of choice functions that are rational by
two sequential criteria.
Theorem 5 A choice function C on D is rational by two sequential criteria
if and only if it satisfies properties γ and P. In this case an explicit –but not
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unique– decomposition is C = Cl ◦ Cu.
Proof.
To prove sufficiency, recall that Theorem 4 yields the existence of the upper
and lower approximations of C in Q0, both being rational choice functions by
Remark 1. The same theorem gives their respective expressions:
Cu(S) = {x ∈ S : ∀y ∈ S there exists S ′ ∈ D such that x, y ∈ S ′ and x ∈ C(S ′)}
and
Cl(S) = {x ∈ S : x ∈ C({x, y}), ∀y ∈ S}.
Let us now prove that C = Cl ◦ Cu.
i) C(S) ⊆ (Cl ◦ Cu)(S).
If x ∈ C(S) then x ∈ Cu(S) because we can select S ′ = S for all y ∈ S.
Let us now suppose that x 6∈ Cl(Cu(S)). In this case there exists y ∈ Cu(S)
such that {y} = C({x, y}) because of the definition of Cl.
From y ∈ Cu(S) we obtain that for all s ∈ S there exists Sys ∈ D such
that y, s ∈ Sys and y ∈ C(Sys).
As C satisfies Property γ we conclude y ∈ C(∪s∈SSys).
Then we have {x, y} ⊆ S ⊆ ∪
s∈S
Sys with {y} = C({x, y}) and y ∈
C(∪s∈SSys).
Applying now that P is verified by C we conclude x 6∈ C(S), against the
hypothesis. Therefore x ∈ Cl(Cu(S)).
ii) C(S) ⊇ (Cl ◦ Cu)(S):
Select x ∈ Cl(Cu(S)), thus by the definition of Cl we have that x ∈ C({x, y})
for all y ∈ Cu(S). In particular x ∈ C({x, y}) for all y ∈ C(S) (because
C(S) ⊆ Cu(S)). As we have that C satisfies Property γ we conclude x ∈
C(C(S)) ⊆ C(S).
Example 5 accounts for lack of uniqueness.
Conversely, Lemma 1 ensures that if C is the compound choice function of
two rational choice functions CR1 and CR2 then C satisfies property γ, thus it
remains to prove that it satisfies property P too.
Let us select {x, y} ⊆ S ⊆ T such that {x} = (CR2 ◦ CR1)({x, y}) and x ∈
(CR2 ◦ CR1)(T ). We prove that y 6∈ C(S).
Indeed let us suppose that y ∈ C(S). Then we have
(y, s) ∈ R1 for all s ∈ S and (y, s′) ∈ R2 for all s′ ∈ S such that s′R1s for
all s ∈ S
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As we also have that x ∈ (CR2 ◦ CR1)(T ) we obtain (x, t) ∈ R1 for all t ∈ T. In
particular:
i) (y, x) ∈ R1 because x ∈ S, and (x, y) ∈ R1 because y ∈ T, which implies
that CR1({x, y}) = {x, y}.
ii) (y, x) ∈ R2 because xR1t for all t ∈ T and S ⊆ T, which implies that
y ∈ CR2({x, y}).
Thus y ∈ CR2({x, y}) = CR2(CR1({x, y})) = C({x, y}) which contradicts the
hypothesis and concludes the proof. 
Examples with three alternatives can be designed where Cl in Theorem 5 is
indecisive even if C is single-valued. That is the case of e.g., the choice function
in Masatlioglu et al. [18, page 10] that illustrates their definition of an attention
filter. Nonetheless as has been explained, Cl must be nonempty-valued on the
subset {Cu(S) : S ∈ D} due to the fact that C = Cl ◦ Cu and C is decisive.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have studied the class of set-valued choice functions that results when we
compound rational choice functions. As a previous step we have performed
an analysis of relevant properties of the compound function that stem from
axioms for choice functions. The following tables gather these results.
C1 C2 C2 ◦ C1
A A A ?
A CH CH ?
A C C ?
A SUP SUP †
B+CH B B ‡
C1 C2 C2 ◦ C1
FR FR FR
FR QTR QTR
FR AR AR
QTR QTR B
AR AR B
Table 1 Table 2
In Table 1, cases ? are proved in Aizerman and Aleskerov [3]. Example 2
proves that even if SUP and γ are imposed then composition does not pre-
serve the Chernoff condition. Nonetheless this property is transmitted to the
compound function when C2 satisfies it and C1 satisfies the stronger Arrow’s
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axiom. We complement this study with assertions † and ‡ that are proved in
Propositions 1 and 2 respectively.
By using the classical axiomatizations of salient specifications of rationality
these assertions produce Table 2, where FR, QTR and AR hold for full ra-
tional, quasi-transitive rational and acyclic rational (⇔ rational) respectively.
Corollaries 1 to 5 make the assertions in this table explicit.
We have then tackled an inverse problem: we study when a DM’s behavior can
be explained as the sequential application of two rational choice functions, that
is, when her choice function is rational by two sequential criteria. We obtain a
characterization of this type of set-valued choice functions. Uniqueness is not
guaranteed but our proof is constructive and an explicit solution is provided
in terms of approximation choice functions.
Our results refer to the domain D consisting of all the finite and nonempty
subsets of the grand set. They would not be affected if the domain includes
all the infinite subsets as well. Some of them remain true for domains that
contain all pairs and all triples from the set of alternatives X.We have focused
on this case in order to avoid unnecessary technicalities and concentrate on
the sequential choice.
Manzini and Mariotti [16] first studied the particular case of single-valued
choice functions. By considering that a choice function C is rational when there
is an asymmetric relation P such that C(S) = {x ∈ S|@y ∈ S for which (y, x) ∈
P}, they characterize single-valued choice functions that are rational by two
and three sequential criteria. Apesteguía and Ballester [5] extend the Manzini
and Mariotti’s result to the sequential application of an arbitrary number of
rational choice functions. Our article refers to the wider class of set-valued
choice functions, nevertheless it does not compare to their results because
asymmetry is not an issue. The model in Masatlioglu et al. [18] is especially
close to ours when the filter of attention (the selection of the subset of alter-
natives that the DM actually has in mind when he makes the choice) satisfies
the Chernoff condition, but their approach is bound by uniqueness of the
selections and their axiomatics is stated accordingly.
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